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27 August 1982

**USSR REPORT
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ARMED FORCES

LEGALITY IN USSR ARMED FORCES DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 7, Jul 82 pp 14-16

[Article by Maj Cen Justice V. Novikov and Col Justice N. Kuznetsov: "Socialist Legality in the USSR Armed Forces"]

[Text]

SOCIALIST legality is a principle of state and public life. It consists in meticulous, consistent and uniform observance of legal standards in building socialism and communism. Already in the early period of Soviet power V. I. Lenin called for strict compliance with its laws and prescriptions and care to see that they were observed by all. He wrote that it was necessary to observe not only the letter, but also the spirit of our communist legislation, not to permit even a shade of deviation from our laws.

He hinged the absolute observance of laws and decisions of state power on sound, scientifically substantiated organisation of administration. This he regarded as a condition for the complete triumph of the Soviet system.

Taking into account the role of legality in the life of Soviet society V. I. Lenin elaborated its fundamental theoretical propositions, which are still valid today.

The adoption of the new Constitution of the USSR in 1977 opened a new stage in the development of the legal bases according to which the Soviet state and its agencies function and in the strengthening of socialist legality. Article 4 of the Fundamental Law reads:

"The Soviet state and all its bodies function on the basis of socialist law, ensure the maintenance of law and order, and safeguard the interests of society and the rights and freedoms of citizens."

It was mentioned in the Report of the Central Committee to the 26th Congress of the CPSU that the renovation of Soviet legislation on the basis of the Constitution has produced a powerful and useful effect.

Obligatory observance of socialist legality also fully applies to the bodies of military control and administration, to officers and all personnel serving in the Armed Forces of the USSR, because, under the Constitution of the USSR, servicemen have the same rights and duties as all Soviet citizens. Strict observance of socialist legality is a guarantee of the implementation of CPSU policy in the military sphere, of uniform solution of all questions bearing on military development, of maintenance of firm military order and high disciplinary standards in the Armed Forces of the USSR, of unity and smoothness in the military establishment, of correct functioning of all officers and other servicemen, of civilian workers and office personnel employed by the Soviet Army and Navy, the frontier guard and interior service troops.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union plays a key role in ensuring strict observance of socialist legality in the Soviet state and its Armed Forces. Its efforts in this field are manifested in various forms. The Party guides the legislative activity of the state, the improvement of the USSR's legislation in general. It organises and conducts work in the legal education of citizens, rearing them in the spirit of respect for and observance of Soviet laws. Party control, which is effected in the military sphere with account of the specifics of military development, is an effective means for ensuring socialist legality.

It is the immediate duty of the Military Councils, bodies of military control, commanders and chiefs to see that the laws are strictly observed and to strengthen discipline in the Soviet Armed Forces. It is the unit (subunit) commander who bears personal responsibility for all aspects of the life and functioning of his command. Consolidating legality and legal order in the units is an important duty also of political workers and Party organisations. Military collectives and their members constitute a major force in strengthening military discipline and legal order in subunits. In the Armed Forces as in the whole country, supervision and right of complaint are effective means for maintaining legal order in the Armed Forces.

In ensuring the observance of laws V. I. Lenin paid special attention to supervision over their fulfilment.

The procurator's office is a key instrument in the observance of legality within the Soviet Armed Forces. V. I. Lenin pointed out that it was the duty of the procurator's office to see that laws

are uniformly interpreted and applied in the Soviet state. It is the duty of the Procurator-General of the USSR and military procurators (each within his competence) to exercise supreme power of supervision over strict and uniform observance of laws in the Armed Forces of the USSR. The office of the Military Procurator contributes to the education of all servicemen in the spirit of exact and unswerving observance of the Constitution of the USSR, the Soviet laws, the Oath of Allegiance, the military regulations and manuals, and the rules of socialist society. Military procurators are vested with the relevant powers to enable them to exercise their supervisory functions.

As bodies of socialist justice the military tribunals play a big role in maintaining legality. They combat attempts on the security of the USSR, the fighting efficiency of its Armed Forces, military discipline and military service procedures accepted in the Armed Forces of the USSR.

As bodies of military justice, the military tribunals and military procurator's offices ensure the observance of legality in the Armed Forces with the help of specific forms and methods. In pursuit of their duties they work in close cooperation with the command, political organs, army and naval personnel.

As a means for ensuring legality in general control covers all aspects of life in the Armed Forces. It is an effective instrument for strengthening discipline and socialist legality. V. I. Lenin pointed out that checking people and actual execution of assignments constituted a key condition for the advancement of "all work, all policy."

In the Armed Forces control is effected through a system of various bodies taking into account the specifics of military development and the concrete tasks facing the army and the navy. From the standpoint of its character and of the bodies effecting it, control is subdivided into Party, state, people's and public control.

Party control is conditioned by the prestige of the CPSU and its leading role in Soviet society. It is control over the fulfilment of Party policy, decisions and directives. It forms a component of the constant organisational work of the Party and its bodies.

The Party does everything possible to provide the army and navy with the most up-to-date means of armed struggle, to raise the standards

of their organisation and discipline, to enable them to carry out their missions effectively and be ready at all times to deal a crushing blow at any enemy. The CPSU Central Committee sees to it that the policy and concrete measures worked out by the Party in the military sphere are firmly and unconditionally implemented. In addition to a whole range of other measures, Party control is carried out for this purpose. It is carried out by the entire system of Party and political organs which function in the Armed Forces. Of course, each Party or political organ, each Party organisation wields control powers in varying degree, within the scope of its competence.

State control in the Armed Forces is exercised by the highest bodies of state power and state administration of the USSR both directly and indirectly, through regular control bodies (such as state inspectorates), certain central state bodies (such as ministries and state committees), bodies of military administration and specially created control-auditing bodies of the military department. Such control is connected with state guidance and control of the Armed Forces, and this imparts to it a uniform state character.

Control exercised by the Supreme Soviet is conditioned by the latter's status as supreme representative body of state authority rested with full legislative and, hence, leading and control powers. The competence of the Supreme Soviet extends among other things to such questions as war and peace, organisation of the USSR defences and guidance of the Armed Forces. The USSR Supreme Soviet effects control over key matters of military development, in keeping with its constitutional powers.

The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet decides questions bearing on the country's defence and guidance of its Armed Forces. Like the USSR Supreme Soviet as a whole, the Presidium exercises control in the process of state guidance of the Soviet Armed Forces. It sees to it that the legal acts drafted or adopted by executive-administrative bodies are in full conformity with the law. In this respect the Presidium ensures that legal acts in key matters of the life and functioning of the Armed Forces, acts which establish the rights, duties and responsibilities of servicemen are not in contradiction with the current legislation of the USSR. Such control is effected by examination and approval of military regulations, manuals, instructions and other acts being drafted.

Being the highest executive and administrative body of state authority the USSR Council of Ministers exercises its control functions in the process of guiding the Armed Forces in their development. In directing the work of the Ministry of Defence and other central military control bodies the Council of Ministers of the USSR effects control over the fulfilment of its decisions and orders on matters of military control, provision of the Armed Forces with all the material supplies and support needed by the personnel. The USSR Council of Ministers also examines and approves statutes on the service of officer personnel, praporshchiks and mitchmans. At the same time it sees to it that all draft legal acts on these matters conform to the requirements of legality.

State control and inspection play the corresponding role within the system of state control. Among them are the State Forestry Inspectorate, State Fisheries Inspectorate, the State Hunting Inspectorate, Sanitary Inspectorate, State Fire Fighting Inspectorate, State Mining Inspectorate, State Boiler Inspectorate, State Land Use Inspectorate, State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate, etc.

The powers of state inspectorates cover the military sphere too. As a rule, as far as military organisations are concerned, their functions are limited to supervision to ensure that military organisations observe the regulations obligatory for all. Such supervision is organised taking into account the specifics of military organisation and is usually supplemented by inner-departmental supervision.

People's and public control are also components of the system of control in the Armed Forces.

People's control is exercised by people's control groups and posts in military units, establishments and schools, by people's control committees of military districts, groups of forces, fleets and large formations, and also by the People's Control Committee of the USSR. It is conducted with broad participation of army and navy personnel.

Public control in the USSR Armed Forces is exercised within the allowed limits by mass public organisations, and also by army and navy personnel bodies, their representatives, and directly by individual servicemen, workers and office employees of military units and establishments. An

important means of servicemen's participation in control is their right to file complaints and statements with the relevant military and state bodies.

In their work bodies called on to fulfil the law and other legal acts, to ensure socialist legality and discipline in the Armed Forces use the method of persuasion. However, if persuasion is not effective they can resort to measures of compulsion. This conforms entirely to Lenin's thesis that legality is ensured not only by supervision over the fulfilment of laws, but also by punishment for failure to observe the law. In this respect the method of persuasion, i. e. of developing in servicemen a conscientious attitude towards their duty, a sense of lofty responsibility for enhancing the combat readiness and combat efficiency of the Armed Forces, is the core of ideological education. Legal education of Soviet servicemen is an integral part of this work.

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ARMED FORCES

FORMAT FOR SEMINAR ON TACTICS GIVEN

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 7, Jul 82 pp 17-18

[Article by Col A. Akimov, under the heading "Combat Training": "Seminars on Tactics"]

[Text]

SEMINARS in tactics are an important element in the process of instruction in military educational establishments and in the system of officer training in the forces, for they provide the possibility, through constructive discussion, to get a deeper insight into the most complicated theoretical questions of a modern all-arms battle.

Literature on method describes several forms of seminars, e. g. seminars held for the purpose of deepening, consolidating and checking trainees' knowledge, those involving research on individual key questions of tactics, and so on.

The choice of the form is determined by the purpose of the seminar, trainees' theoretical level and the time allotted. The form generally used to organise seminars for officers with medium tactical training standard is the first, whereas research-type seminars are held for theoretically well grounded officers to acquire skills in scientific research and recording its results.

To enable trainees to prepare for a seminar thoroughly and in good time, they are given an assignment, laying down the main questions and the literature to be studied. A seminar normally lasts 4 to 6 hours.

The success of a seminar largely depends on the methods of preparing and conducting it.

The preparation for a seminar includes specification and assessment by the instructor of the initial data and the working out of reference material, the instructors' and trainees' independent preparation, and also the provision of the seminar with training aids.

First of all the instructor specifies the initial data, i. e. the theme of the seminar, training purposes and questions to be dealt with. In so doing, he proceeds from the data contained in the tactics

curriculum and from the senior commander's directions, after which he familiarises himself with the necessary literature and determines training purposes and questions.

Having, for instance, specified the theme "Advance of a Battalion" the following training purposes may be outlined: to deepen and consolidate officers' theoretical knowledge of a battalion's offensive battle and to arrive at a common understanding of the questions studied; to teach officers to substantiate theoretical propositions thoroughly by the relevant calculations and experience of the last war and exercises; to mould officers' Marxist-Leninist world outlook, conscientiousness, and high moral, political and combat qualities.

Proceeding from the purpose of the seminar, the instructor assesses the list and content of training questions.

Here are tentative questions in the above-mentioned theme: organisation and combat potentialities of a battalion; battalion's combat missions in the offensive; a battalion's combat formation in the offensive; organisation of an offensive; conducting an offensive. It is also practicable to particularise the content of each question. Thus, the third question may be divided into the following subquestions: definition of combat formation; assuming combat formation and demands on the latter; elements of combat formation, their purpose, composition, etc.

After this the instructor proceeds to work out the assignment for the seminar and the plan for conducting it. The assignment is a working document for the instructor and trainees. It includes the theme, training purposes and questions, and the list of basic literature, i. e. articles of instruction documents, pages of text-books and other sources which the officers must study and which they must be able to summarise, and also sketches which they must be able to draw. Besides, the assignment may indicate additional literature contributing to extend officers' tactical knowledge; this literature may include, for example, printed lectures and articles from military periodicals. The end of the assignment contains indications as to what must be done before the beginning of the seminar. The plan of the seminar is the instructor's main document in organising and conducting it. This is particularly true of military educational establishments, where a seminar on a given theme is held for several groups simultaneously. Besides the initial data, the plan lays down the general instructions on the methods of conducting the seminar, instructions on the methods of tackling the training questions with a vari-

ant of calculating the time required to work them up; recommendations on the procedure of the officers' preparation for the seminar, and on provision of training facilities for it.

The general instructions in method contain recommendations on the instructor's opening address and on the procedure for conducting the seminar.

The instructions on how to deal with individual training questions describe methods to be used by the instructor, e. g. how to begin, conduct and finish discussions on each question; the method of using technical training facilities. Examples from the experience of the Great Patriotic War and exercises are most carefully selected and brief calculations and other data are presented.

The instructor's preparation consists in independent study of the assignment and the plan of conducting the seminar.

The plan includes: the theme, training and educational aims, theses of the opening address; training questions properly substantiated by calculations and brief definitions of the most important propositions; a variant of distribution of the time allotted for working up the training questions; provision with training aids. It is recommended to indicate the number of officers to be asked to speak on each question, what methods to use in doing so, what additional questions to ask in order to liven up the discussion, on what aspects to focus attention in dealing with each individual question. The main points to be touched upon during the general critique of the seminar are given in the end of the plan.

To give purpose to the seminar, with a lively constructive discussion taking place, the officers should be prepared beforehand, by group and individual consultations. Apart from studying the recommended literature, they should make notes, draw sketches and make brief plans of their contribution to the seminar. It is also practicable for one of the officers to prepare to speak on particularly complicated matters. One or two days before the seminar the instructor checks the officers' readiness.

Conducting the seminar. The seminar begins with the opening address, in which the instructor discloses the essence and topicality of the theme, and its significance in the kind of combat actions being analysed, citing examples from the Great Patriotic War and exercises. Then he announces the order of the seminar, training questions and the sequence in which they will be dealt with. The first to speak on each question is given 10-15 minutes. If an officer has used up his time he may be given another five minutes to present new

data. The officer's talk should be planned in good time.

Such a method, however, is not acceptable for all seminars or all questions to be dealt with. It is most often used at research seminars, where the officers must speak to the point, complement, extend and deepen the theme studied. If an officer is not sufficiently active, the instructor may ask him to give his opinion on this or that subject.

Whether or not the training purposes of the seminar are attained largely depends on the instructor's ability to create an informal atmosphere, favourable for free exchange of opinion. For this purpose it is necessary to think in good time of questions to be asked and at what stage of the seminar they should be asked.

To appraise the quality of officers' preparation for the seminar and their ability to expound their ideas in logical sequence, the instructor may either let the trainees speak at their request or name the speaker. It is, of course, necessary to combine the two methods in a rational way; otherwise, only well prepared officers will speak, while those with insufficient knowledge of the matter will keep silent. Asking too many questions, on the other hand, may reduce the seminar to merely answering them.

During the seminar the instructor watches closely how the trainees present the material, whether they are able to express their ideas logically and concisely and to single out the main points. If an officer makes mistakes in expounding the question, the instructor should correct him.

After discussing each question the instructor sums up the results, supplements or specifies individual points so as to enable the officers to get a clear idea of the question dealt with.

When all the questions have been exhausted the instructor notes in conclusion how deeply they were examined, explains the essence of the main theoretical propositions of the theme, and elucidates questions on which the trainees voice different opinions. He also points out mistakes in principle, appraises the officers' preparation and gives assignments to each trainee.

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ARMED FORCES

COMBAT TRADITIONS OF GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR DISCUSSED

MOSCOW SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 7, Jul 82 pp 25-26

[Article by I. Bulin, under the heading "The Making of a Soldier": "Based on Combat Traditions"]

[Text]

COMBAT traditions in the Soviet Army and Navy are historically formed customs and rules which have become the norm of fighting men's behaviour in battle and inspire them to discharge their military duty in an exemplary manner in peace time.

Combat traditions include devotion to the Socialist Motherland and constant readiness to defend it with arms in hand; heroism and selflessness in battle, faithfulness to military duty, the Oath of Allegiance and the battle colours; collectivism, comradeship-in-arms and mutual assistance; respect and love for one's commander and readiness to defend him in battle; constant striving to perfect combat skills and enhance the combat readiness of the unit, subunit or ship; loyalty to internationalist duty and soldierly brotherhood between the servicemen of the socialist community countries.

The combat traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces were born in the flames of the Civil War and in the struggle against the overthrown exploiting classes and foreign interventionists.

The revolutionary experience of the Communist Party and the Soviet people is the main source of combat traditions in the army and navy.

Traditions inspire servicemen to imitate heroes of the past and present both in battle and training. The Soviet people single out particularly those rules and customs which have become rooted owing to the triumph of the new social system — socialism. The principle of Soviet society "A man is a friend, a brother and comrade to his fellow-man" has become a standard of the Soviet way of life. Handing down their life experience to young people, the older generation follows Lenin's behests, remembering his words about the

necessity of striving to place the entire set of customs, skills, habits and ideas developed by the working class over many decades of struggle for political freedom at the service of education for all the working people.

The educational role of combat traditions lies in the fact that they enable each serviceman to get a clear idea of the heroic deeds performed by older generations and become imbued with the respect for the difficult but honourable duties of a defender of the Motherland and the people's socialist gains. Propaganda of combat traditions promotes continuity of generations, the welding of the personnel into a single combat family and enhancement of the combat readiness of military collectives.

The men of the Soviet Armed Forces are educated in combat traditions by combat training and political education, propaganda and cultural work, and in everyday life as a whole, the main attention being paid to getting the serviceman to realise deeply the essence and significance of revolutionary and combat traditions of the people and the army and to act according to these traditions. An active part in the educational work is played by all commanders and political workers, and Party and YCL organisations in units and sub-units.

Examples of heroism, courage and valour displayed by Soviet fighting men in the struggle for the freedom and independence of the Socialist Motherland play an important role in instilling high moral and combat qualities in the younger generation of servicemen. Lectures, reports and talks about heroes and the feats of arms performed by them, meetings with veterans of the Great Patriotic War (1941-45), showing of feature films and documentaries, thematic get-togethers, readers' conferences and oral magazines and other forms of educational work used in units, subunits and on ships of the Soviet Armed Forces provide lessons of courage and heroism.

Meetings with participants in the Great Patriotic War leave a particularly deep imprint on servicemen's minds. One such meeting took place in a unit of the Order of the Red Banner Volga Military District on the day of the unit's anniversary. The personnel were formed up on the drill ground, all officers and men wearing their Orders and medals.

Soldiers' and sergeants' dress tunics were decorated with badges "Excellent Serviceman of the Soviet Army," rated specialists and rated sportsmen. After the solemn parading of the unit colours the commander introduced front-line soldiers who had come to take part in the celebrations. After that everybody went to the club.

The club was lavishly decorated for the festive occasion. The orchestra played songs of the Ci-

vil and the Great Patriotic wars, about the Communist Party and the Soviet Army.

The meeting was opened by the unit commander, who told about the regiment's combat record, its heroes and the present-generation servicemen following in their fathers' footsteps. Then Lieutenant-Colonel of the Reserve Nikolai Safronov took the floor. The servicemen listened to the veteran with great attention. They were particularly impressed by the story of thefeat of arms performed by Sergeant Ivan Sotnikov.

It was at Kursk. Nazi tanks had attacked the positions of Soviet artillerymen several times during the day. Each time they withdrew, leaving burning machines on the battlefield. But the ranks of the Soviet fighting men were thinning too. One gun was served by only two survivors — Sergeant Ivan Sotnikov, the commander, and the loader. During the next attack the commander took his place at the sights. An accurate shot hit an enemy tank. Sotnikov took aim at another tank. But he had no time to fire: he heard a deafening explosion nearby, and the blast wave hurled him several metres away from the gun. An excruciating pain in the waist made him nearly faint. The loader had been killed. Ivan mustered his last strength and crawled up to the gun. He loaded, aimed and fired.

The enemy was repulsed. Soon reserves were brought up. The men counted seven destroyed tanks in front of Sotnikov's fire position.

"For this heroic deed," Safronov concluded, "Senior Sergeant Sotnikov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union."

The next to speak was Major of the Reserve Yemelyan Sergeyev. During the war he was a signalman, twice wounded and awarded Orders and medals. But Sergeyev, like many other front-line soldiers, was reluctant to speak about himself. He told the story of another signalman — Private Matvei Putilov. Though an enemy mine splinter had fractured Matvei's right arm, he continued to fulfil the assigned mission. Having located the break in the communication line, he gripped the ends of the wire between his teeth and died ensuring communication for his commander.

Senior Lieutenant of the Reserve Anatoly Yemelyanov told about thefeat of arms performed by Private Sultan Amiraliyev. When surrounded by the nazis, he blew himself up with the enemy soldiers.

The emotional impact of the veterans' stories was intensified by demonstration of fragments from films about the Great Patriotic War.

Then soldiers and sergeants assured the veterans that they would multiply the glory of front-line soldiers by their successes in combat training.

An important place in educating servicemen on the traditions of war-time heroes is occupied by Museums and Rooms of Combat Glory in units and formations.

The airmen of the N... air unit fought courageously on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. Nineteen of its men were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, two of them twice. The unit has a Museum of Combat Glory displaying more than 200 various exhibits and documents, among them personal belongings of Heroes of the Soviet Union and letters from their parents. One stand shows documents narrating the unit's combat operations, immortal feats of arms performed by their older comrades during the war and the successes of the present-day generation in combat training and political education. Commanders, political workers, Party and YCL activists regularly give talks to the personnel by this stand. Not infrequently the museum is visited by the unit's veterans — Merited Military Pilot of the USSR Colonel (Ret.) N. Palagin, Major G. Petrik, Captain N. Stenshin, Starshina R. Derevnin and others. The servicemen listen with great attention to their stories of heroic deeds performed by those who served in the regiment during the war and of patriotic undertakings of young airmen multiplying the glory of their predecessors.

For active work in the military-patriotic education of young servicemen the unit's Museum of Combat Glory has been awarded a diploma of the Ministry of Defence of the USSR.

War veterans, advanced working people and parents of fallen heroes are often invited to many units and formations at celebrations of outstanding events in the history of the Soviet state and its Armed Forces.

Challenge prizes for the best company, platoon or section have been instituted in many units in honour of front-line soldiers.

Discussion of literary works on the military-patriotic theme contributes to educating servicemen on the traditions of war-time heroes. Great interest was aroused by discussing the book "Small Land" by L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

For Soviet soldiers and officers the feats of arms performed by older generations of defenders of the Motherland have always been a striking example of courage and heroism, of service of the Socialist Homeland.

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ARMED FORCES

PSYCHOLOGICAL TRAINING OF SERVICEMEN DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 7, Jul 82 pp 27-28

[Article by Col V. Grinov, under the heading "Psychological Training": "Heroes Are Not Born"]

[Text]

THE RUSSIANS have a saying: courage overcomes all obstacles. These words acknowledge the exceptional importance of courage in winning victory in battle.

The provision of the army with the latest equipment and weapons, far from precluding heroism, courage and gallantry, creates an acute need for these qualities.

Courage is contempt for faint-heartedness and weak will. A courageous man can resolutely master fear in the face of danger and deadly risk. Besides that, the gallant behaviour of fighting men can urge on their comrades to selfless and heroic actions in battle and in complicated training and exercise situations.

But courage really is of value only when it is based upon a true estimate of the situation. When a courageous, gallant deed proceeds not from lofty motives and incentives but, say, from ambition it can be considered, in all fairness, as "reckless daring." Much can be done with such daring but by far not everything can be achieved. To display real courage means to accomplish acts dictated by objective necessity and a real situation.

The antipode of courage is cowardice. Veterans assert that the faint-hearted, cowardly person perishes first. An exaggerated idea of an imminent danger paralyses him, depriving him of the ability to act with intelligence and to take into account the changes in the situation. This leads to death.

A fighting man develops courage, heroism and gallantry in the process of intensive combat labour. Each day of military life teaches him to overcome difficulties in combat training and to apprehend what is new. Marches, field days, firing,

combat machine driving, parachute jumping, guard duty and especially combat duty polish traits of his character and train endurance, self-command, courage and other features.

A big role in developing these features in fighting men belongs to commanders and political workers. Their explanatory work, support, encouragement of courageous and resolute actions contribute to consolidate the best traits in servicemen.

...A steel cable broke during an exercise in forcing a rapid mountain river that was swollen after abundant rain. One end of it disappeared in the water. It had to be got out. Fulfilment of the assignment entailed danger to life. But Private P. Yarisev jumped boldly into the water. After a while he came to the surface holding the end of the cable and a minute later, having overpowered the mountain stream, got out on the bank. The crossing was resumed.

When the platoon had crossed to the opposite bank the commander thanked the soldier officially before the unit in formation and held him up as an example for his courageous act.

Striving to inculcate courage and resoluteness in their subordinates the officers make wide use of wartime examples in their educational work.

...Tactical exercises, maximally approximating a combat situation, were planned. In accordance with the plan of Party-political work Lieutenant V. Lobchikov, a Communist, held a talk "In the Field as in Battle" with the men. He gave special consideration to questions of courage and resoluteness. The talk took place by the stand dedicated to Heroes of the Soviet Union and bearers of the Order of Glory who had served in the regiment.

"This was in March 1943 near the village of Taranovka in the Ukraine," the officer said. "A group of infantrymen under platoon commander Lieutenant Pyotr Shironin barred the enemy's way. Five days and nights the nazis hurled into battle large tank and infantry forces but could not break the resistance of the heroic warriors. For displaying courage and heroism all the men were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Love of the Motherland, courage and staunchness led them to victory."

Summing up, Lieutenant Lobchikov underlined especially that a courageous man can display will-power and overcome the sense of fear in any situation.

Such talks were often conducted by participants of battles and veterans of the Great Patriotic War (1941-45). For example, the soldiers listened with

great interest to the bearer of the Order of Glory of three classes Nikolai Kresyukov. He told the about several combat episodes, in which he himself took part.

Concluding his talk the front-line soldier said: "Courage always contains elements of risk, but a risk that is built on exact calculations and deep sense of duty. Heroism and courage is an absolute sense of responsibility for the fulfilment of assigned task, for the success of the company or unit."

Strong characters, we know, are formed and hardened in conditions of maximum tension involving danger, not in hothouses. Repeated overcoming of hardships and perilous situations creates reserves of confidence and serves as a firm basis for courage and resoluteness. When a man has undergone some trial he can calmly say himself when encountering it again: "There is nothing to be afraid of. I have already experienced it." He will also act with more confidence in complicated situation.

Difficult obstacles generally contain additional "irritants" affecting servicemen's psychics and making them overcome fear. Once I happened to be in a motorised infantry unit together with a group of veterans. We were taken to an obstacle zone and told that it was an ordinary one, the kind we had seen before. It was indeed so — ditches, trenches, artificial obstacles, structures, barriers, one-log foot-bridges and so on. But hard had the trainees moved forward one after another, when explosions began to thunder all over the zone and clouds of fire and smoke shot into the sky. The hot breath of flames, pungent smoke, roars of explosions, the rattle of loudspeakers all created an illusion of genuine battle. Formerly we veterans did not have to negotiate such obstacles. Today's fighting men negotiate one obstacle after another amidst thunder and flames, swiftly, bravely and dexterously...

Every exercise in moral and psychological hardening is thoroughly prepared. Necessary safety measures are taken because live shells are very often fired over the heads of the men taking part in the exercise. The conditions are often very close to combat situations and the trainees have to solve tasks that demand self-control, endurance and resoluteness.

It is a real school of courage and resoluteness to experience hardships in everyday studies and life. Nobody who goes through this school with honour will lose his head in minutes of serious trials, he will come out on top.

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ARMED FORCES

WARTIME OPERATIONS: THE STALINGRAD FRONT

MOSCOW SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 7, Jul 82 pp 35-38

[Article by Col Z. Shutov, Cand. Sci. (History), under the heading "Military History": "Defensive Battle"]

[Text]

Forty years ago, on July 17, 1942 began the Battle of Stalingrad, which made a decisive contribution to achieving a turn in the course of the Second World War in favour of the anti-Hitler coalition. Below is the story about the defensive period of the battle, which lasted up to November 19, 1942 — the day when the Soviet Army launched a counteroffensive at Stalingrad.

In the winter of 1941-42 in the course of the Battle of Moscow and the general offensive of the Soviet Army, the nazi Wehrmacht suffered the first major defeat in the Second World War. The military-political leaders of nazi Germany spared no pains to replace losses in men and equipment, to recapture the initiative and to achieve decisive results in the war against the Soviet Union. Since the Wehrmacht could no longer launch an offensive simultaneously in all the most important directions, the nazi Command decided to prepare a powerful blow at the southern flank of the front. Its main purpose was to defeat the groupings of the Soviet forces, to capture most important economic areas of the south of the USSR, including the Caucasus.

The Soviet Command too planned to carry out a number of offensive operations on various sectors of the front, in particular in the Kharkov area. In May 1942 it began active combat actions there. During the fierce fighting that ensued the Soviet forces had to withdraw. As the enemy was reckoning on a quick and easy capture of Stalingrad, his main grouping rushed to the Caucasus. At the same time the nazi 6th Army had the mission to defeat the Soviet units in the area between the Don and the Volga and to capture Stalingrad, thus cutting the communications connecting the country's central areas with the Caucasus.

On July 17, advance guards of the 6th Army's divisions met in the great curve of the Don the advanced detachments and mobile obstacle detachments of the 62nd and 64th armies of the Stalingrad Front, formed on July 12. For six days the Soviet fighting men had been fighting in the combat security zone. Their stubbornness and activity shook enemy confidence in his ability to carry out the mission easily. He had to deploy prematurely part of the main forces of the 6th Army.


The situation changed rapidly. The enemy was still concentrating the main effort in the direction of the Caucasus. However the nazi Command came more and more to realise that without the defeat of the Soviet forces in the Stalingrad area and the capture of the city it would be impossible to secure stability of its forces' strategic front in the south.

Day after day ever new forces of the Wehrmacht were hurled into fighting for Stalingrad. Towards the evening of July 22, when the 6th Army approached the FEBA of the Stalingrad Front, it comprised 18 divisions. They were faced by 16 Soviet divisions. The correlation of forces in men and equipment, tanks and aircraft was in the enemy's favour. Only in artillery and mortars was there approximate equality.

The Command of the nazi 6th Army intended to deliver two flanking blows, to encircle and destroy the Soviet forces holding defences in the great curve of the Don, and to reach the area of Kalach, then by the shortest route (Kalach-Stalingrad) to break through to the Volga. The enemy's northern strike grouping consisting of two corps was being formed in the Perelazovsky area and the southern grouping, also consisting of two corps, in the Oblivskaya area.

At dawn on July 23, the enemy's northern strike grouping mounted an offensive. In the direction of the main blow the enemy achieved a multiple superiority in men, artillery and mortars, and in tanks. The nazi aviation was constantly striking at the Soviet forces' battle formations. However, the enemy did not manage to achieve a decisive success. The Soviet fighting men heroically repulsed attacks by enemy tanks and infantry and did not allow them to penetrate deep into their defences.

On July 25, the enemy threw into battle his southern grouping. Towards evening he managed to break through on the right wing of the 64th Army, thus threatening to outflank the 62nd Army from the south.



The Battle of Stalingrad. Defensive stage (July 17-November 18, 1942)

The Soviet Command quickly prepared a strong counterblow at the attacking enemy. The main part in it was assigned to the 1st and the 4th tank armies. Air support was provided by the 8th Air Army and long-range aviation. The general leadership of the organisation and carrying out of the counterblow was effected by Colonel-General A. M. Vasilevsky, the Chief of the General Staff, who arrived in the Stalingrad area on July 23. The counterblow was delivered on July 25-27. Though it did not lead to the defeat of the enemy who had broken through to the Don, it did frustrate his plan to encircle the 62nd Army.

The active and stubborn defence of the forces of the Stalingrad Front and the heavy losses sustained by the enemy compelled the Nazi Command to stop their attacks. In preparation for a new blow it brought up large forces. The 8th Italian Army arrived in the fighting area. At the same time the enemy 4th Tank Army was switched from the Caucasian direction to Stalingrad. The army was assigned the mission to deliver a blow along the Tikhoretsk-Stalingrad line of advance, thus helping the 6th Army to capture the city. Having failed to break through to Stalingrad through Kalach from the west, the enemy began preparations to capture the city by blows from the west and south-west.

The Soviet Command prepared thoroughly to beat off a new enemy onslaught. It covered his intention in good time and took all necessary measures to strengthen its forces on the threatened line of advance.

On August 2, the forward units of the enemy 4th Tank Army approached Kotelnikovsky, where they encountered the forces of the 64th Army. Stubborn fighting on the south-western approaches to Stalingrad ensued and continued without interruption for a week. To defend this line of advance a new South-Eastern Front was detached from the Stalingrad Front on August 7 and Colonel-General A. I. Yeryomenko became the front commander. On August 9-10 the forces of this front delivered a heavy surprise counterblow in the Abganerovo area and forced the 4th Tank Army to assume the defensive.

During the fighting on the far approaches to Stalingrad (from July 17 to August 10) the Soviet forces frustrated the plan of the Nazi Command to break through to the Volga by a rapid blow on the move. During three weeks of offensive the enemy advanced only 60-80 km. An important part in enhancing the Soviet fighting men's staunchness was played by Party-political work carried out without interruption even in the most complicated situations. It was wholly based on the

motto: "Not a Step Back!" The political workers and army Communists displayed examples of stubbornness in defence, were the first to rise for counterattacks, carrying along the entire personnel. The Soviet fighting men showed mass heroism.

Late in August the fighting spread to the near approaches to the city.

In order to cross the Don by assault, the enemy concentrated nine divisions in the small river bend between Trekhostrovskaya and Luchensky. After an assault crossing of the river they were to deliver a blow towards the east and reach the Volga north of Stalingrad. On August 19, the 6th Army resumed the offensive. As a result of severe fighting it managed to force the Don and on August 23 to break through to the Volga in the area of the Rynok settlement and to cut off the 62nd Army from the rest of the forces. That very day the nazi aviation subjected Stalingrad to a barbarous bombing. In a few hours it carried out 2,000 sorties. Buildings were falling to the ground, oil-tanks were burning, the water mains and the city transport were put out of action. Many thousand civilians were killed. But the population went on fighting. Works continued to produce guns and tanks for the front, the inhabitants of the city, mainly women, worked tirelessly to organise defensive fortifications.

On August 25, a state of siege was proclaimed in Stalingrad. By decision of the City Defence Committee hundreds of thousands of people, mainly women and children, were evacuated in a few days from the burning city to the other bank of the Volga.

The Supreme Command GHQ ordered the Command of the Stalingrad Front to destroy immediately the enemy who had broken through to the Volga. Counterblows delivered by the Soviet forces on August 23-28 in the direction of Stalingrad from the north forced the enemy to transfer considerable forces there. Pressure on Stalingrad was thus weakened. On the side of the city all reserves of the front were thrown against the enemy who had broken through to the Volga. They stopped the enemy advance on the northern and north-western approaches to Stalingrad.

The German 4th Tank Army passed over the offensive on August 21 and in three days advanced 25 km north-east of Abganerovo. Here it was stopped by counterblows of the reserves of the 64th and 57th armies. After redeployment the enemy again launched an attack. By the end of August 29, he broke through the defences. To

shorten the frontage and to preserve his forces the front commander decided to withdraw the 62nd and the 64th armies to the city's inner defence ring.

At that difficult time the Supreme Command GHQ reinforced the forces operating in the Stalingrad direction with the 24th and 66th armies. The 1st Guards Army was brought up to strength and the 16th Air Army was included in the Stalingrad Front. From a line south of Kachalinskaya-Dubrovka these armies carried out a number of offensive operations which considerably helped the defenders of the city to repulse the enemy advance.

Hitler ordered the Commander of Army Group "B" to capture Stalingrad as quickly as possible. The mission of capturing the city was assigned to the 6th Army under F. Paulus, reinforced by the 48th Tank Corps of the 4th Tank Army. The latter was assigned the mission to clear the western bank of the Volga south of Stalingrad of the Soviet forces.

The defence of the city was entrusted to the 62nd Army under Lieutenant-General V. I. Chuikov and the 64th Army under Lieutenant-General M. S. Shumilov. On September 28, by the order of GHQ the Stalingrad Front was reorganised into the Don Front under Lieutenant-General K. K. Rokossovsky while the South-Eastern Front became the Stalingrad Front under Colonel-General A. I. Yeryomenko. The fronts were given the categorical order to hold the city at any cost. Jointly with the armed forces, the inhabitants of the city took part in the fighting, forming workers' battalions and destroyer detachments.

The enemy reinforced the strike group of the 6th Army and achieved superiority over the 62nd and the 64th armies: 1.8-fold in infantry, 1.7-fold in artillery and 4.1-fold in tanks.

From September 13, fierce street fightings ensued in Stalingrad. The nazi troops delivered two blows at the central part of the city. By these blows the nazi Command intended to split the front of the Soviet defence and capture the city.

Fighting in Stalingrad went on day and night. All the nazis' hopes to break down the resistance in one or two days collapsed. Still they managed to penetrate into the centre of the city. On the left flank at the limiting point with the 64th Army the enemy reached the Volga. Bloody battles were fought for every building, for every storey. The Soviet fighting men frequently counterattacked. The Mamai Hill — the height dominating the central part of the city (as well as many other objectives) passed from one side to the other several times.

From September 27 the workers' settlements and the Orlovka area became the centre of fighting. Simultaneously the nazis renewed blows in

the centre of the city. The 13th Guards Infantry Division under Major-General A. Rodimtsev, the 138th Division under Major-General I. Lyudnikov, the 95th Division under Colonel V. Gorishny, the 308th Division under Colonel L. Gurtsev and many other formations and units courageously repulsed continuous enemy attacks. Heroism became a matter of course for the Soviet officers and men. Late in September a group of men under Guards Sergeant Ya. Pavlov consolidated in a four-storey house in the 9th January Square. For 58 days a multinational garrison of "Pavlov's House," consisting of Russians, Ukrainians, Uzbeks, Tatars, Kazakhs and Georgians fought the enemy and did not surrender. Soldiers N. Saralnov and M. Chembarov had to fight an unequal engagement with 10 enemy tanks. They disabled one tank with antitank rifle fire, set three on fire with incendiary bottles and then, tying grenades round their bodies they threw themselves under the tracks of enemy tanks. The words pronounced by sniper V. Zaitsev: "There is no land for us behind the Volga!" became law for the defenders of Stalingrad.

The Soviet fighting men also beat off this enemy assault. From September 27 to October 8 along the main line of advance the nazis advanced only a few hundred metres, though this resulted in deteriorating the position of the 62nd Army. Now it was defending a narrow 25-km strip and manoeuvre with men and equipment was hampered. The bulk of the artillery had to be sited on the eastern bank of the Volga. Army and division staffs deployed on the steep slopes of the western bank of the river some 200-800 m from the FEBA.

From October 9, the main events spread to the area of the Tractor Works and the Barrikady and Krasny Oktyabr works. In the course of battles unprecedented for their ferocity which lasted up to November 18, the nazi forces cut the 62nd Army in three parts. But still they did not manage to break its resistance. The weakened and exhausted enemy stopped his attacks and assumed the defensive.

The defensive period of the battle on the Volga lasted four months. The defenders of Stalingrad withstood fierce enemy blows and held an operational-strategic bridgehead important for deploying the counteroffensive, which began on the Stalingrad front on November 19, 1942. In battles on the approaches to and in the city the nazi forces lost nearly 700,000 in killed or wounded, over 2,000 guns and mortars, more than 1,000 tanks and assault guns and over 1,400 combat planes. The enemy was exhausted and demoralised.

At the same time the Soviet Command thoroughly prepared a powerful blow at the enemy, which, as further events testified, took him completely by surprise.

ARMED FORCES

WARTIME OPERATIONS: NAVY-ARMY COOPERATION DURING 1941-1942 DESCRIBED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 7, Jul 82 pp 39-41

[Article by Captain 1st Rank G. Ammon, Cand Sci (History): "Navy-Army Cooperation"]

[Text]

The article discusses cooperation between Soviet naval and land forces in defensive operations of 1941-42.

• IN THIS period of the Great Patriotic War fierce fighting developed along the whole length of the Soviet-German front, extending for thousands of kilometres from the Barents Sea in the north to the Black Sea in the south. It was in that period that the enemy lost the best, most experienced formations of his army and was finally stopped.

The assistance rendered by the Soviet Navy to land forces was of special importance for the successful outcome of this struggle in coastal areas. In close cooperation with land forces all naval arms, above all surface ships, coastal artillery and naval aviation, took an active part in defending naval bases, maritime beachheads and the coast. The flanks of the Soviet front were always reliably protected from the sea.

Naval artillery gave powerful support to the troops defending Tallin, Odessa, Sevastopol, Leningrad, Novorossiisk and a number of other bases and beachheads. The most widely used and effective method of joint army-navy operations was the landing of river and sea task forces. In 1941-42 alone the Soviet Navy landed 40 amphibious parties, more than one third of all tactical and operational landing operations during the war. The importance of these operations for the successful defence of Leningrad, the Polar Circle, Odessa, the Crimea and the Caucasus can scarcely be exaggerated. Marshal G. K. Zhukov wrote: "Naval landing detachments were often sent behind the enemy lines. They always displayed exceptional courage, and effectively upheld the honour and dignity of the Soviet Navy."

Sea transportation of troops and military cargoes was of great importance.

The Danube Naval Flotilla started active actions at the very beginning of the war. On the night of June 21, 1941 its ships opened concentrated artillery fire on massed enemy forces to prevent them from crossing the frontier rivers Prut and Danube. Soviet sailors mined shipping channels. On June 25-26 the Flotilla landed task forces at a number of places in Romanian territory. The troops landed routed enemy garrisons and occupied a beachhead about 70 km in length. These were the first Soviet landing operations in the Great Patriotic War. Enemy attempts to land troops on the Soviet banks of the Prut and Danube failed.

Close cooperation of the Flotilla with the land forces held up the enemy offensive on the front sector from the Danube estuary to Galatz for almost a month.

In the Baltic area the Nazi Command planned to capture Liepaja, the advanced base of the Baltic Fleet, not later than the second day of the war. But the enemy offensive was broken up by the 67th Rifle Division supported by sailors and workers' detachments. On June 24 the enemy bypassed Liepaja in the north and cut off the base garrison. The ships left for other ports and those under repair were blown up. Their complements went ashore and continued to fight on defensive fortifications. In spite of the Combined air, naval and land blockade, Liepaja's courageous garrison supported by fire of the coastal and AA artillery managed to hold up an offensive by superior enemy forces for almost a week.

On the northern flank of the Soviet-German front (in the Murmansk sector) the enemy was stopped on June 30, on the second day of the offensive. In this area Soviet land forces twice inferior in strength and short of artillery and aircraft were supported by all the forces of the Northern Fleet. In 1941 alone destroyers and patrol ships of the Fleet put out to sea more than 60 times to bombard coastal targets. During six months of that year naval aviation made 10,000 sorties, 70 per cent of them in support of land forces. Naval pilots destroyed more than 150 enemy planes in the same period.

To frustrate the enemy offensive in the coastal sector the Northern Fleet ships landed three tactical forces totaling 2,500 men in July 1941. Half of the troops landed were Marines specially trained for action in severe northern conditions. Their daring attacks drew off about one third of the enemy's forces and the whole of his heavy artillery. As a result the enemy offensive was considerably slowed down. The Chief of Staff of the Nazi 19th Mountain Corps appraised the landing operations of the Northern Fleet as follows: "The Russians managed to use the open sea route to launch counterattacks by transferring their forces from the area of the Motov Bay into the rear of German forces advancing to Litsa. In our land offensive we forgot about sea cover."

The Northern Fleet landed tactical parties in the following years too. One of them was a party more than 6,000 men strong landed on Cape Pikshuyev in April 1942.

It should be noted that all the parties were landed successfully and took the enemy by surprise, and that our troops suffered hardly any losses. This was all secured

by rapid and secret preparation of operations by the Fleet Command, dispersion of ships on the sea passage, skilful selection of the landing place, due consideration to weather conditions and other factors.

Of great significance during the defence of the Polar Circle was quick sea transportation of troops across the Kola Bay. During the first week of the war the Northern Fleet lifted to the northern sector of the front the 52nd Rifle Division and replacements and cargoes for the 14th Rifle Division, which was covering the frontier. More than 95,000 soldiers and 70,000 tons of military materiel were transported by sea at times of decisive battles. Besides, the Fleet lifted more than 44,000 men to other sectors of the front in the White Sea. The significance of these naval activities is understandable if one takes into account the fact that all personnel, weapons, ammunition, vehicles and other cargoes were transported to these sectors only by sea.

As a result of close cooperation of the Northern Fleet and the 14th Army the nazi advance to Murmansk was frustrated.

In July 1942 the Northern Fleet was given responsibility for the defence of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas. In order to combine the efforts of the army and navy, the Northern Defensive Area (NDA) was organised. It played an important role in covering from the sea the ice-free port of Murmansk — the main base of the Fleet through which ocean communications with the Western Allies were maintained.

The 30,000-strong NDA garrison — land troops, artillery batteries and Fleet ships — was constantly engaged in combat activities. Repeated attempts of the nazi Command to disrupt this communication route by bombardment from coastal batteries and attacks from the air were a complete failure.

Shoulder to shoulder with the servicemen of the Army the sailors defended Leningrad. At the beginning of the defence the land forces were short of artillery. So coastal and ships' artillery provided the fire shield of the city on the Neva. In September 1941 about 400 naval guns ranging in calibre from 100 to 406 mm bombarded the enemy on the near approaches to the city.

During the whole of the Leningrad blockade, i.e. from September 1941 to January 1944, the Baltic Fleet artillery successfully fought enemy siege artillery, firing during that period close on 400,000 large-calibre shells. Hundreds of times naval artillery forced the enemy to cease the barbaric shelling of the city. It should be noted that the contours of the front and its distance from besieged Leningrad were determined largely by firing range of naval artillery.

A single road, called "The Road of Life," connected blockaded Leningrad with the "Big Land." In the navigational period shipments were effected by the Ladoga Military Flotilla ships and civilian vessels. During the blockade more than 1.8 million men and 2 million tons of freight were transported across the lake. "The Road of Life" was one of the important factors ensuring the impregnability

of the city of Lenin. Large land and naval forces were sent to defend it.

In 1941 the Baltic Fleet was also engaged in evacuating and transporting to other areas great numbers of troops. Thus, the Fleet evacuated troops from Tallin, the Moon-sund Islands, the Koivisto and Sortavala areas and the garrison on the Hanko Peninsula. During the summer and autumn of 1941 the Fleet ships and other vessels transported a total of some 150,000 men and quantities of material and weapons which were later used in the defence of Leningrad.

The Black Sea Fleet also carried out varied and intensive combat activities. Jointly with land forces it neutralised large enemy forces in coastal areas. A good example of the Fleet's skilful operations is the defence of Odessa.

In September 1941 the enemy managed to reach the coast in the Odessa area, from which they could shell the city and the port. Having reinforced the units defending Odessa, the Soviet Command ordered them to counter-attack. To support a frontal attack by the army forces it was decided to land a marine regiment in the Grigoryevka area, a cruiser and two destroyers being used for this purpose. During the night of September 21 the regiment was landed, and, supported by ships' artillery, launched a swift attack. At the same time a paratrooper detachment successfully attacked the enemy from the rear. As a result of co-ordinated actions of the landing force, land troops, naval ships and aviation, two enemy divisions were routed by the end of the day. The enemy lost about 4,000 officers and men killed, wounded or captured. The threat to Odessa was eliminated.

The Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation (December 1941-January 1942) was one of the biggest during the last war, with two cruisers, six destroyers, and dozens of other fighting ships participating.

In the course of this operation the Black Sea Fleet landed 22,000 servicemen and their equipment in the Feodosiya area, and the Azov Military Flotilla and the Kerch naval base put about 42,000 men and large amounts of material ashore on the Kerch Peninsula.

The 250-days heroic defence of Sevastopol would have been impossible without the powerful support of the Black Sea Fleet. The Fleet ships evacuated troops defending Odessa, Sevastopol and the Kerch Peninsula. About 50 ships and transport vessels took part in the well-organised evacuation of the Odessa garrison (mid-October 1941). They transported to the Crimea 86,000 officers and men and tens of thousands tons of military freight. The Fleet ships evacuated 45,000 men from Sevastopol.

River and lake naval flotillas also made a great contribution to the stability of the Soviet forces' defensive system and the slowing down of the enemy advance during defensive operations. In addition to giving fire support, river and lake flotillas transported large amounts of troops and military cargoes.

Thus, in August-September 1942, during defensive fighting at Stalingrad and in the Northern Caucasus, the Caspian Military Flotilla shipped about 100,000 men and quan-

tities of military cargoes. During the Battle of Stalingrad the sailors of the Volga Military Flotilla transported under enemy fire more than 120,000 men and thousands of tons of cargoes. V. I. Chuikov, Commander of the 62nd Army, wrote that shipments from the left bank of the Volga to the city and the flanks of our armies were a matter of life and death for Stalingrad.

The active assistance rendered by the Soviet Navy in 1941-42 to the land forces contributed greatly to thwarting enemy offensive plans.

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AIR FORCES

GROUND TRAINING FOR PILOTS DESCRIBED. PART 1: TRAINING COMMANDERS

MOSCOW SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 7, Jul 82 pp 20-21

[First of a three-part article by Col Yu. Leonov, Military Pilot First Class:
"Pilots' Ground Training: Part I: Training of Commanders"]

[Text]

Ground training of the Soviet Air Force personnel, an integral part of combat training as a whole, is carried out to improve ideological, political and military-theoretical knowledge and professional skills, and also the quality of preparedness for fulfilling flying missions. Ground training includes training of commanders, flight preparation and drills. This issue carries the first of three articles on ground training.

1. TRAINING OF COMMANDERS

Training of command staff includes political education, operational and tactical, special, military-technical, firing, reconnaissance, physical, and method training. Special groups, e.g. commanders', chiefs' of staff, pilots' and navigators' groups, are established for the purpose. Programmes are drawn up for each category of trainees to study during command training classes, assemblies, specialised training, training in method, and also during demonstration and instructors' lessons. Individual work also forms part of command training.

Assemblies and monthly officer classes are the principal forms of command training. Practice has shown that the most appropriate time for assemblies is before or at the beginning of the academic year for the first assembly, and May or the first months of the summer train-

ing period for the second. Organising officer training for different categories of flying personnel contributes to unity of instruction methods, enables the trainees to gain a deeper understanding of the subjects studied, contributes to ensuring an adequate training base, raises the quality of lessons and drills, and allows advanced experience to be generalised and put into practice.

Lessons in method and instructors' lessons are carried out in respect of leading subjects, generally before each new theme. The number, duration and sequence of lessons are determined by the commander proceeding from the composition of the groups, the condition of the training base and the importance of forthcoming missions. Special days and hours during service hours are allotted for individual study.

Training forms and methods within the system of command training depend on the content of training subjects, purpose of training, categories of trainees and their proficiency standards. Operational and tactical training themes are usually worked up during group exercises and briefings, while themes in firing, reconnaissance, military-technical and special training are developed during group "practical" lessons or drills.

Several training subjects are generally tackled at group exercises. During such exercises pilots consolidate their theoretical knowledge, develop skills in organising combat operations and in controlling crews in the air. The flying personnel are assembled in one training group to study at the opportune time the necessary literature and the obtaining tactical situation, and prepare to perform the functions of one or several officials. When conducting a group lesson, the commander normally checks the pilots' preparedness for it, then works up the items of the theme and holds a critique.

Briefings take place in classrooms with the use of maps, the purpose of a briefing being to check pilots' knowledge and skills in quick and independent assessment of the situation, taking a decision, assigning combat missions to subordinates, and also in instilling in them high moral, combat and psychological qualities.

To systematise and streamline officer training, the unit works out a typical monthly plan, determining training weeks and days for each category of trainees. The best plan, however, will be meaningless without strict supervision of its fulfilment. Realising this, each unit commander and staff closely follow pilots' training and regularly hold check lessons for them. A very effective means of checking is half-yearly and final examinations in the principal subjects of professional training, examinations during in-

spectors' checks and on promotion in proficiency rating.

Operational and tactical training, the main kind of training for pilots, is aimed at more effective use of all manpower and equipment available and devising and practising methods of actions which allow the combat potentialities of modern weapons and equipment to be used to the maximum.

Officer training is not a goal in itself; it is a means for accomplishing the main task — further enhancing the combat readiness of units and subunits. This is quite evident from the contents of flying personnel's tactical training. The majority of themes studied at group exercises and tactical briefings corresponds to, and generally precedes, the themes and tasks to be tackled during flights for combat practice and tactical air exercises.

Air combat is a two-way process, in which the opposing sides' capabilities manifest themselves with particular clarity. All other conditions being equal, success in battle attends him who is better prepared from the tactical point of view, is able to foresee the development of events and to use military cunning when necessary. The experience of the last war shows that victory over the enemy was generally scored by those pilots who possessed these qualities.

In modern conditions the importance of cunning and the ability to outwit the enemy has grown considerably. This can be explained by numerous factors, primarily by the greater fire power of weapons and manoeuvrability of aircraft.

A very important role in successfully solving the tasks of training the personnel to act in extreme situations is played by assemblies, which take place in a specially equipped training centre or classrooms. The themes of special training are studied jointly with the other subjects.

Engineering and technical training is inseparably linked with spe-

cial training. In using modern combat equipment it is not sufficient to have only practical skills. Today, as never before, firm knowledge of the fundamentals of physics, mathematics and other sciences are quite indispensable. That is why the line of enhancing the level of pilots' engineering standard is perfectly justified. The final goal of the process of instruction being to ensure high combat readiness and flight safety requires pilots to have knowledge of a pronounced applied nature.

Demonstration lessons and drills, also occupying a prominent place within the system of officer training, are carried out with account of the combat experience and changes resulting from perfection of weapons and equipment.

Extending and deepening pilots' knowledge, including general, military and purely special, is one of the most significant factors determining their success in mastering modern aircraft equipment and weapons and using them in combat. This aspect of air fighter training should be stressed because its fruits ripen gradually and, though individual training tangibly improves airmen's combat standards, it is unfortunately not always estimated at its true worth.

Individual work takes up much of the time allotted for ground training; it is, in fact, the main method for improving officers' theoretical knowledge. It is quite understandable then that success depends first of all on the pilot's ability to apportion his time in the most rational way and to work properly with books. The classroom equip-

ment is of no small importance too. It is natural that before proceeding to study a new theme or assess an assignment, e.g. in tactics or aerodynamics, the officer sees to it that he has all the necessary reference books and visual aids. A brief plan showing the sequence of the material to be studied and stressing the importance of individual items is drawn up before the lesson.

Each pilot has a personal monthly plan of individual study indicating all the necessary themes in the various subjects according to the combat training programme. Commanders take an active part in drawing up these plans.

Widely popular in units and sub-units is also the practice of working out the theme and subsequently expounding it before the flying personnel. This is usually done in the following manner. An officer makes a detailed study of the theme and communicates his knowledge to the listeners. The rest of the officers also prepare for the lesson thoroughly and advance their opinions or the questions studied.

The ability to work independently is particularly important for political education, which is based on studying Marxist-Leninist theory. This is obvious, because one will never be able to assimilate Lenin's ideological legacy without persistent daily work. Sound ideological knowledge helps airmen to acquire flying skills quicker.

Airmen's command training is a many-sided process requiring painstaking work on the part of all commanders and organisers of studies.

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GROUND FORCES

COMMANDER'S INDEPENDENCE ON BATTLEFIELD DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 7, Jul 82 p 19

[Unattributed article, under the heading "Modern Battle: Questions and Answers": "Operation Order and Decision"]

[Text]

Can a battalion CO issue an operation order before his decision is approved?

The order and content of the battalion CO's activity in organising an offensive battle depend on the situation, and mainly on the time available and the method of passing over to the offensive.

At first he analyses the mission, determines where to concentrate the main effort, what part of the enemy grouping must be destroyed, how, proceeding from the frontage of the zone of attack and the depth of the combat mission, to assume a better combat formation. Then he envisages the measures to be carried out immediately in the interest of preparing and fulfilling the forthcoming mission and does the timing. He gives instructions to the chief of staff on how to bring the assigned mission to the knowledge of his subordinates, on issuing warning orders and carrying out on-the-spot reconnaissance.

Having given instructions to the chief of staff the battalion CO sets about analysing the situation. After that he takes a decision and reports it to the regimental commander. If the decision is approved, the battalion CO issues a combat order (assigns combat missions) to his sub-

ordinates, attached and supporting subunits, organises cooperation with them and their supply. After the combat order (combat mission) is assigned, company commanders begin their activity directed at organising battle.

Such is the usual sequence of the activity in organising an offensive. Its positive side lies in the fact that acquaintance with the combat mission proceeds gradually and the number of persons knowing it broadens as the beginning of the offensive approaches. This favours secrecy of the plan. The main shortcoming here is expenditure of time. Therefore, if time is limited, the battalion CO, having taken a decision, may immediately assign combat missions to his subordinates. Such a necessity arises in particular when the battalion CP-OP is located at a considerable distance from the CP of the regiment or when the regimental commander cannot be informed of the battalion CO's decision. For example, when the CP-OP is located 5-7 km from the CP the battalion CO will need a long time to go there and back. Some 20-30 min will be spent on reporting the decision. If three or four battalion commanders must report their decision in turn then the last will do so 1.5-2 hours later than the first. In order not to lose precious time

some battalion commanders may first assign combat missions to the subunit commanders and then report on them.

It may happen that combat missions will be assigned to subunits but the regimental commander will not approve them. Of course, this may happen, though very seldom, if a battalion commander does not properly specify the mission. Usually the decision of the battalion CO does not give rise to any special remarks on the part of the regimental commander. Some points may have to be specified which will not entail considerable changes in the decision. Therefore, immediately after specifying the mission, the battalion CO brings the main elements of his decision to the knowledge of company commanders in the form of warning orders. Warning orders speed up this process by making it possible to carry out a number of measures before receiving the order. These measures include: preparation of topographic maps of the area of the forthcoming actions, replenishment of stocks, deployment of combat and transport vehicles on the line of advance, etc. (for details about a parallel method see "Soviet Military Review" No. 2, 1981). In other words the battalion CO first of all assigns combat missions, although not complete, to his subordinates, and then reports his decision to the regimental commander.

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NAVAL FORCES

ADMIRAL I.M. KAPITANETS ON SOVIET NAVY'S ACHIEVEMENTS

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 7, Jul 82 pp 9, 12-13

[Article by Adm I. M. Kapitanets, Commander Red Banner Baltic Fleet: "Guarding Sea Frontiers"]

[Text] Ivan Matveyevich Kapitanets began his service in the USSR Armed Forces in 1946. In the Northern Fleet he occupied different command posts, was the first deputy commander of the Twice Order of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. Since February 1981 he has been in command of this fleet.

He graduated from a Higher Naval School, the Naval Academy and the K. Ye. Voroshilov General Staff Academy of the USSR Armed Forces.

Admiral I. M. Kapitanets is a Deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian SSR. He has been awarded numerous Orders and medals.

THE SOVIET NAVY worthily embodies the sea might of the great socialist power. The radical qualitative changes it has undergone were connected with introduction of nuclear power, missiles, radio electronics and computers on fighting ships and their provision with aircraft. The navy has well-trained commanders, political workers and engineer personnel who are distinguished by high morale and combat qualities, collectivism, friendship and comradeship and boundless devotion to the Leninist Party and the Soviet people.

The twice Order of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet is a component part of the Soviet Navy. Its entire combat road had been one of selfless service to its Socialist Motherland. It was created in fire of the Revolution, grew and developed in the struggle against the enemies of the Socialist Motherland.

As we know, the epoch of socialism began at the time of the historical shot fired by the Baltic Fleet's cruiser "Aurora." Young seamen are frequent guests of the legendary cruiser. They pay a tribute of respect to those who made the first con-

tributions to the glorious heritage of the Baltic seamen.

From the beginning of the Civil War and foreign intervention the sailors selflessly defended the gains of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Nearly 60,000 men went to the land forces. There was not a single substantial sector of the struggle where detachments of them were not fighting.

During the stern years of the Great Patriotic War the Baltic seamen worthily multiplied combat and revolutionary traditions. At the first stage, when the Soviet Army held in check the onslaught of the nazi forces, the Baltic Fleet reliably protected the country's land forces against blows from the sea. Jointly with them the fleet defended coastal towns and bases and landed amphibious troops. The historical defence of Leningrad and the Moonsund Islands will always be a brilliant example of combat cooperation of the fighting men of the navy, army and the people. Wide known are the feats of arms of the defenders of Liepaja, Hanko, Tallinn, the courageous Kronstadt sailors, heroes of the Road of Life to Leningrad and brave Baltic Fleet pilots who were the first to bomb Berlin — the den of nazi Germany. Later the Baltic Fleet, jointly with the Ladoga Flotilla, successfully helped the Soviet Army in the offensive operation to break through the Leningrad blockade. The seamen ended the war in this theatre by landing troops on the nazi-occupied Danish Island of Bornholm.

In four years the enemy lost in the Baltic 1,205 fighting ships and other vessels and over 2,000 combat planes.

The Motherland highly appraised the exploit of the Baltic Fleet sailors. Many of them were awarded the highest decoration — Hero of the Soviet Union — and four were honoured with this title twice. Many ships, formations and coastal units were awarded Orders and promoted to the Guards.

In their delirious dream of enslaving the Soviet people the nazi leaders planned to crush the world's first socialist state by a surprise blow. But they miscalculated. They came up against the insuperable socio-political monolith of Soviet society, whose basis was the inspiring and organising force of the Communist Party, the Soviet socialist system, socialist ideology and the unbreakable alliance of the working class and the collective farm peasantry.

The fleet's heroic past is unforgettable. The immortal feats of arms of the Baltic seamen are an inexhaustible source of strength and inspiration, moulding in the young generation high moral, po-

litical and combat qualities. In all battles against the Motherland's enemies they displayed mass heroism, unbending will for victory, staunchness, courage and unsurpassed combat skill.

For example, speaking of the glorious feats of arms of the Baltic Fleet's submariners one cannot forget the considerable contribution they made to the theory and practice of battle. The results of their torpedo attacks, particularly towards the end of the war, were substantial thanks to the accumulated experience, the commanders' increased tactical skill, use of new methods of firing and improvement of base conditions. The Soviet submarines successfully broke through the powerful deeply-echeloned submarine barriers and dealt irresistible blows at the enemy.

Today the basis of the Soviet ocean fleet consists of nuclear-powered submarines of various purposes. Such qualities as great cruising capacity and high combat capabilities are inherent in all the latest achievements of scientific and technological progress. The brain, talent and skill of the Soviet people are incarnated in these submarines. By the will of the Communist Party and the efforts of the state they have rightfully become the main striking force of the navy — the ocean shield of the Socialist Motherland.

L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Chairman of the Defence Council, Marshal of the Soviet Union highly appraised the actions of the troops and the Baltic Fleet at the "Zapad-81" manoeuvres. This appraisal inspired the Baltic seamen and the entire personnel of the Armed Forces for new successes in their military labour. Never stopping at what has been accomplished, the seamen spare no pains to enhance their skill and strengthen combat readiness.

Year by year the missions carried out by the fleet are becoming more complicated, greater in scale and diversity. Development of cooperation and team-work of the various types of forces, mastering of the most effective means and ways of using their armament in battle, ship and formation control require constant creative search and approach to each training battle. The level of seamanship, combat maturity of ships' commanding officers is determined by real readiness for fighting a modern battle in the most complicated conditions with a strong and technically well equipped enemy. It is from these positions that commanding officers, political bodies and staffs approach organisation of training and education of the personnel, the spreading of socialist emulation.

Undoubtedly, in the struggle for the combat readiness of ships and units each link of the complex naval organism, from control and support agencies to the ship or antisubmarine crew, occupies an important place. Nevertheless the decisive role belongs to the ships' commanding officers, who bear personal responsibility before the Party and the state for the armament entrusted to them, for training and educating the personnel and for maintaining high combat readiness.

The ships' combat readiness is in fact the highest and the main yardstick of combat training. Its criteria are the qualitative and normative indices. And indeed, if a mission has been worked up and carried out in an excellent way on the ship, or a combat exercise has been prepared and perfectly fulfilled during the set time, this means that training time has been skilfully used. The same may be said of training a sailor, an action station, a group, a department where the indices of using the allotted training time may be turning over a department or action station ahead of time for independent servicing, worked up normatives, fulfilling the required volume of work, and so on. In all cases the effectiveness provides the mutual link between the time spent and the results achieved.

The main attention of the fleet's personnel is directed at further improving the qualitative indices in combat training. The fleet's fighting men solve many problems during long cruises and flights. It is there that they really get to know what modern battle is, acquire practical skills in competent use of weapons and equipment. Today too the sea is the best school for training crews, checking mastery and combat readiness. But a cruise, an exercise will produce the necessary result only if it is thoroughly prepared. Each cruise for carrying out tactical, fire and other missions is preceded by all-round preparation of the crew and the ship at base.

An important means of increasing effectiveness and quality of training is a socialist emulation, which is influencing more and more actively the whole course of the training and educational process. It stimulates the search for the new, ensures prospects for exceeding established norms and gives birth to new methods of using weapons and equipment.

The striving to improve combat skill and increase military and political knowledge is a distinctive feature of the Baltic seamen. Broad support was given to the movement for full interchangeability at action stations, for mastering a second and related specialities. Way back in 1962

Starshina 1st Class A. Chekhla initiated emulation in the fleet for mastering several specialities to obtain a rating in each. This initiative lives on in the fleet up to the present day. On fighting ships and in units socialist emulation of the personnel has spread for the right to a rating and the title of excellent ships and subunits.

Recently socialist emulation in the fleet was enriched with new content and forms and its educational role was increased. Emulation between ships and formations is constantly spreading. In it the social activity of the Soviet fighting men becomes apparent and great scope for initiative is opened out.

It is gratifying to note that the military collectives who initiated socialist emulation in the Baltic Fleet befittingly fulfilled their role of right-flank men. Among them is the crew of the excellent submarine "Ulyanovsky Komsomolets." For several years already it has been the leading ship in the fleet in mastering the most effective methods of using weapons, improving training standards of men and officers. At one time "Ulyanovites" were the first in the fleet to support the initiative of the All-Union Socialist Competition in honour of the 60th anniversary of the Great October. Last year the crew of the escort ship "Neukrotimy," continuing the tradition, successfully fulfilled high obligations under the motto: "For High Combat Readiness and Firm Military Order!"

Now the relay has been taken by the crew of the escort ship "Druzhny."

Traditions of the fleet and the Armed Forces are a powerful moral weapon for navy men. Exercises and manoeuvres are often carried out in places where the land is steeped in the blood of heroes, where numerous monuments testify to their military valour. The young generation of sailors follow the heroes' examples and compete with them.

During the "Zapad-81" exercise, for example, at the call of the big landing ship "Krasnaya Presnya" "Follow a Hero's Example!" all fighting ships, units of the Marines and the fleet aviation taking part responded in a short period of time. The entire course of the exercise, the numerous examples of selflessness, initiative and courage displayed by the personnel are evidence that the fighting men have worthily taken over the heroic relay.

The war veterans were replaced at these posts by well-trained, energetic and resolute admirals and officers, mitchmans, starshinas and seamen—their worthy successors. Having mastered new fighting ships and modern materiel, the present

generation of seamen have been through systematic training in long ocean cruises and navigation and acquired reliable sea steeling.

The Baltic sailors display the high sense of patriotism and proletarian internationalism characteristic of them. The commanders, political workers and Party organisations pay great attention to developing friendship of the fighting men of the various nationalities of our Motherland and also to strengthening and developing such traditions as combat cooperation with the sailors of the fraternal socialist countries. This tradition was born during the Great Patriotic War. Today the Baltic seamen strengthen their friendship with the sailors of the People's Navy of the German Democratic Republic and the Navy of the Polish People's Republic. This friendship is vividly manifested in the course of the annual meetings, sessions, exchange of experience and also in joint cruises, at manoeuvres and exercises. Showing an example in carrying out training and combat missions they readily share experience with their comrades-in-arms. Such undertakings make it possible to strengthen the unity of the fighting men of the socialist states and are a splendid school for enhancing the training standard of the personnel. The Fleet's Military Council and Political Department make wide use of each joint exercise for organising concrete Party-political work in the internationalist education of the seamen. Great significance in fulfilling its internationalist missions also attaches to official visits and service calls by ships to foreign ports.

Following Lenin's behests — to be like the heroes of the October Revolution, to imitate their selflessness and heroism, the personnel of the Twice Order of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet spare no pains, give all their knowledge and experience for further strengthening the combat might of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Their duty under the Constitution — to provide reliable defence of the Socialist Motherland and to be in constant combat readiness, guaranteeing that any aggressor is instantly repulsed — is carried out with credit by the Baltic sailors.

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NAVAL FORCES

AVIATION ON THE ASW SHIP 'MINSK' DESCRIBED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 7, Jul 82 pp 31, 34

[Article by Eng Col Ye Aleksandrov [and] Eng Col V. Dedov: "Guests of Cruiser Minsk's Airmen"]

[Text]

THE ANTISUBMARINE (ASW) cruiser "Minsk" is a unique ship. In addition to artillery, depth-charge launchers, various missiles and other weapons, it is equipped with helicopters and vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) aeroplanes, considerably extending the ship's combat capabilities.

The distinguishing feature of the "Minsk"-based planes is that half of each wing is raised in the parking area to save space, and lowered on the deck before take-off.

After a slow turn on the deck the plane taxes out to the take-off line. The swelling whine of turbines ends in a sharp roar like an explosion. A jet of burning gases strikes the deck, the plane raises slightly, lifts off and for a second or two is hovering in the air wrapped in a translucent cloud. Suddenly it abruptly rushes forward and begins a steep climb. The undercarriage doors close and the aircraft gathers speed.

...A few flickering spots appear on the screen of an early-warning radar: these are aircraft returning to the cruiser after fulfilling their mission. At first one then two blips become clearly discernible. The plane hovers over the stern and smoothly touches the deck. Then it rolls in where aircraft techni-

cians, armament specialists and fuelers wait to prepare it for the next flight.

The ship's radio announces:

"Vladimir Bayev has completed his first training flight with an excellent mark. I congratulate Comrade Bayev and wish him further success in service. Commander."

One more air fighter has joined the close-knit family of "Minsk" pilots.

On flying days the pilots are the centre of attention of the whole complement of this air-capable ship. This is quite natural. However perfect the modern flight control technique may be, to fly a high-speed aircraft requires special skill, the more so that take-off and landing are to be effected on an "aerodrome" whose area is much smaller than that of a usual one, and which, moreover, is in motion.

A pilot has to work hard before he is allowed to perform independent flights. He must study thoroughly the machine, whose design differs in many respects from that of ordinary jet planes. To be admitted to independent flights he must develop high piloting skills, which also have their own peculiarities, to the point of automation, train for a long time on simulators, perform several dual

flights on a trainer plane and study in detail the tactics of carrier-based aviation. Besides, he must learn to feel confidence in himself over the boundless expanse of the ocean, and this requires deep-going changes in the pilot's psychology.

Certainly, this process is far from easy. But it would be much more difficult were it not for the confidence that at any moment you will be backed up by your comrades, such as Major Yu. Churilov, Captain T. Guzairov, Senior Lieutenant S. Kriklyivkh. They are experienced pilots and are always ready to help others by word and by deed. Of no less importance is the pilot's confidence that in any flying mode and any situation all the systems and mechanisms will operate without fail. This is to be put down to the credit of those who designed the plane, assembled it at the plant and also of those who service it — engineers, technicians, aircraftsmen. The "Minsk" airmen have a number of specific problems whose solution is the responsibility of aviation department specialists. The range of tasks confronting them is extremely wide. One of them is the parking of planes. They must be secured so as to exclude damage when the ship runs into a gale and at the same time to ensure their quick delivery to the lifting devices. To tow an aircraft on the deck or to the parking area, use is made of special prime movers. The latter resemble a usual truck but with a shortened body to ensure high manoeuvrability in confined places. It is not an easy task to drive such a vehicle, especially on a rolling deck. "Driving a car on the ground is a real pleasure after that" — say the drivers of prime movers.

To service helicopters and planes requires a whole complex of different mechanisms and devices. Besides, the ship must carry stocks of fuel, oils, oxygen and other expendable materials, and also of aircraft ammunition. These are delivered to the place where

the aircraft is prepared for flight by means of pumping stations, pipelines, special mechanisms, lifts, etc. There is no need to explain the importance of keeping all these mechanisms always in good repair. Their proper operation determines the combat readiness of aircraft and the ship as a whole.

The aviation department is headed by Captain Engineer Shamil Mukhtarov, son of a regular military pilot, who fought in the Great Patriotic War. From his childhood Shamil dreamed of aviation. But his dream to become a pilot did not come true, he became an aeroneautical engineer, a highly-skilled specialist. The specifics of his duty require wide, comprehensive and deep knowledge. And Captain Engineer Sh. Mukhtarov possesses these. Besides, he is a good organiser, relies in his work on the men, always takes their opinions into account and can inspire them with enthusiasm. It is not fortuitous that the aviation department commander is considered on the ship as one of the best educators and that for a number of years the department has been among the advanced units. But at first, when the command was going to assign Mukhtarov to the post of department commander, some senior officers expressed certain doubts: too young for such an appointment. But youthfulness is a merit rather than demerit, provided it is backed by adequate knowledge, abilities and zeal.

As to Shamil Mukhtarov himself, he attributes the success achieved by the department to the conscientious attitude of his subordinates to their service duties.

The take-off of VTOL aircraft can be seen not only from the flight deck but also on TV screen in the department command room. Only a muffled hum of aircraft engines is heard here; tension in the room is no lower than on deck. The success of flights depends in no small measure on accurate work of those who

watch at control panels, instruments, hanger and compartment mechanisms.

Of course, during flights their mission is flight-operations support. But it is only a part of the general combat task of the ship. Specialists of the engineering department strictly control the operation of the numerous mechanisms. On any ship the engineering department has very complex tasks. And on a ship like the "Minsk" these tasks are even more complicated as in addition to ensuring the motion and power supply of this huge ship, the department must supply power to the aerodrome.

The personnel of the communications department are also swamped with work. They are faced with a dual task: to provide signals for the port to both the airmen and the ship units. Communications must be stable and continuous, and not subject to any "enemy" countermeasures. Faultless operation of the equipment requires high skill of the servicing personnel. The "Minsk" communications department, like in socialist emulation among the ship's units, is famous for its first-class specialists. This is the result of purposeful work by the crew collective, its Party and Komsomol organisations.

...The ship is logging miles and miles. Easily riding the waves, "Minsk" follows the set course. Cruiser turbines hum rhythmically. Helicopters and planes vanish into the space. The "Minsk" seamen are perfecting their military skill.

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LOGISTICAL SERVICES AND SPECIAL TROOPS

REFUELING OF TANKS UNDER COMBAT CONDITIONS DESCRIBED

MOSCOW SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 7, Jul 82 pp 29-30

[Article by Eng Col D. Ryazantsev, under the heading: "Weapons and Equipment": "Fuelling [sic] Tanks During Battle"]

[Text]

Fuelling and refuelling of fighting vehicles is a most important and responsible task of tank battalion technical support during combat operations. The refuelling time depends on the amount of fuel expended, the facilities used, their number and the method of using them. Of no small importance is also the proficiency of tank crews, drivers of fuelling trucks and officers in charge of refuelling.

The basic demands made on the organisation of refuelling during combat operations are as follows:

— uninterrupted delivery of fuels and lubricants to subunits, in the first place to those operating in first echelon;

— strict concealment of movement of delivery and refuelling vehicles and thorough camouflage of subunits' combat formations. To supply vehicles with fuels and lubricants, maximum use is made both of special trucks and battalion transport. The responsibility for preparing vehicles for refuelling and refilling and also for the timeliness of this work rests not only with specialists of servicing subunits but also with the entire personnel — from battalion CO to driver.

The battalion CO establishes the scope and procedure of fuel deli-


very, the area, time and method of refuelling, and how refuelling points

Vehicles can be provided with fuel and lubricants from barrels at field refuelling points or at halts by using individual means and also mobile facilities (fuelling trucks and tank trucks).

Let us compare the time necessary for fuelling vehicles by group (fuelling trucks, water-and-oil dispensers and oil dispensers) and individual means, with 300 litres of fuel being supplied to each of ten tanks. The filling capacity in calculating the time for the given case is assumed to be 60 l/min.

When the fuelling truck moves from one tank to another (see Fig. 1) and filling is effected through one or two hoses, much time is spent on all operations; moreover, the truck's capacity is not utilised to the full.

Complete utilisation of the fuelling truck's potentialities and reduction of time may be achieved by simultaneous refuelling of two tanks through four hoses. Such a method is most practicable on the march, with tanks moving in a column. In this case the truck is positioned on flat ground, two tanks approaching it simultaneously on the right and left. Pairs of tanks may also assume a position relative to each other so



as to allow a passage for the fueling trucks.

This is exactly the case shown in Fig. 2. As compared with the first method it allows the total time to be reduced by half, and the refuelling time proper still more.

The time may also be reduced when individual refuelling means are used; this method, however, necessitates a great number of barrels and trucks to carry them.

To top up tanks with oil and coolant, use is made of water-and-oil dispensers and oil dispensers. As in the case of refuelling, the greatest time economy is attained when trucks move from tank to tank or from one pair of tanks to another.

In the course of an offensive engagement vehicles are normally refuelled on requests of companies and with the permission of the battalion CO. Depending on the situation this operation is performed directly within combat formations (in locations concealed from enemy observation), with refuelling facilities approaching fighting vehicles or vice versa. Subunit commanders in charge of refuelling meet the trucks and accompany them to the designated area.

Complete refuelling of fighting vehicles is done after the combat mission has been carried out, generally at the end of the day. On the

march, the order and frequency of refuelling are determined by the length of the route, the season of the year, the number of vehicles to be refuelled, and the filling facilities available.

To increase the fuel distance, each fighting vehicle is provided with additional containers, e.g. 200-lit barrels are fitted on tracked vehicles.


If need be, fuelling trucks may be attached to the battalion. Normally, they move in the column of the battalion trains or of fighting vehicles.

If the march is performed out of contact with the enemy, fuel and oil refilling is carried out at field refuelling points deployed by the senior commander in good time.

A tactical exercise showed that the most practicable version of refuelling is to attach a fuelling truck and a tank truck to each subunit. These facilities allowed the established time standards to be considerably cut down. During the exercise the fuel supply personnel chose locations which enabled each fueling truck to refuel 2-4 fighting vehicles at a time.

In the course of that exercise the vehicles were also filled from barrels by tank crews.

The tank battalion had broken through the "enemy" defences on



the move and continued to advance successfully. One of the battalion's companies moved on off-the-road terrain, which resulted in increased fuel consumption. By evening the vehicles of this company needed refuelling, the time and place of which were designated by the battalion CO. The chief of the fuel supply service arrived there in good time. As it was impossible for the fuelling trucks to approach the fighting vehicles, he ordered the barrels and cans to be unloaded onto the ground. The tankmen themselves rolled the barrels to the vehicles and filled them with the aid of individual means. After a short time the tank company was ready to carry out the combat mission with the other companies of the battalion.

At another exercise specialists of the fuel supply service were assigned the mission to advance to the designated area, deploy a fuel refuelling point and ensure refuelling for a tank battalion which was heading for the initial line to attack the "enemy." Carrying out such a mission on routes of advance involves a number of difficulties, e.g. shortage of time, great quantity of tanks to be refuelled, necessity to distribute the flow of fighting vehicles according to grades of fuel etc.

Success in carrying out the mission

was largely due to the use of a field refuelling point with flexible hoses. It included flexible hoses wound on a drum installed on a tank truck. At a halt the refuelling point specialists paid out the hoses to each tank and filled it with fuel in a few minutes.

To ensure safety of crews and drivers in the area of the field refuelling point, the tanks moved with hatches closed.

The simplicity of the design of the refuelling point and its high capacity due to simultaneous refuelling of a number of vehicles allowed the refuelling time to be cut by 100 to 200 per cent without disturbing the combat formation.

Of great importance for timely refuelling of fighting vehicles is proficiency of the battalion train personnel, who are taught what is necessary in war. Specialists of the fuel supply service improve their field training standard, study the theory, train to perform all operations within the prescribed time limits and take part in special technical exercises, which are a severe test of their theoretical knowledge and practical skills. If the training is carried out at a high methodical level, the servicemen solve competently all the tasks of ensuring the battalion's technical support in battle.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

COMMENTARY ON CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY GIVEN

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 7, Jul 82 pp 44-46

[Article by A. Vladimirov, under the heading "International Affairs": "Dangerous Evolution of Peking's Policy"]

[Text]

The international conference in Cancun, Mexico, last autumn discussed relations between "the North and the South," in other words, between the industrial capitalist states and the developing countries. The world press gave much space not only to the general problems discussed but also to the bilateral contacts which took place during the conference. Specific coverage was given to the meetings of Premier Zhao Ziyang of China with President Reagan and Japanese Prime-Minister Suzuki. The particular interest of the press in these meetings was not entirely incidental. Intense activities for building a military-political bloc of the two leading capitalist powers with China have been under way for several years. Observers believe that the Cancun meetings constituted another step towards that objective.

CHINA'S TRUE AMBITIONS

THOSE WHO follow the evolution of the current Chinese policy have long since understood that Peking's first priority objective is expansion and domination first in Asia, and then in other parts of the developing world. As early as in 1965, speaking to the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee Mao Zedong urged: "We must by all means obtain South-East Asia, including South Vietnam, Thailand, Burma, Malaysia, Singapore." He pointed to the rich natural resources of that region, which could in future be made use of to develop Chinese industry. South-East Asia is very rich in bauxites, gold, tin, zinc, nickel, manganese, tungsten, oil and natural gas. Except In-

donesia, the countries of that region, though small in size and weak militarily, occupy strategically important positions.

Peking believed it an easy task to bring them under control. However it turned out very soon that the former colonies which had obtained independence refused to yield to a new diktat. China began to shed the aura of guardian of progressive nations which it wore in the early years after the revolution. So Peking changed its tactics and turned to open subversion against its stubborn neighbours, to efforts to destabilise and undermine their national sovereignty. Conflicts were whipped up between the ethnic Chinese and the local population; anti-government, especially separatist movements, were given support in the developing countries of the region. At the same time Peking voiced territorial claims against the neighbours amounting to no less than 10 million square kilometres, that is to an area much greater than China itself. To back up the claims Peking set about arming and training rebellious tribes in the frontier areas (kachin and shan in Burma, naga and mizo in India and Bangladesh). The rebels were trained and commanded by Chinese army officers.

In 1962 China perpetrated an act of aggression against its Bandung colleague, the Republic of India. Trampling the solemnly proclaimed principles of respect of territorial integrity, sovereignty, non-aggression and peaceful coexistence, China occupied 36 thousand square kilometres of India's territory, which it still holds to this day. Threat of force and sometimes direct use of force are becoming a regular feature of Peking's foreign policy. The provocations on the Soviet frontier in 1969, the seizure of the Paracel Islands in 1974 and finally the aggression against Vietnam in 1979 mark the evolution of the Chinese political course.

The peoples of Asia pay with their blood for Peking's expansionism, its policy of destabilisation, interference and incitement of one state against another. The bloody experiment in Kampuchea, where China tried to impose its model of political set-up using its puppets Pol Pot and Ieng Sari, cost 3 million Kampuchean lives.

The Chinese rulers do not confine their attention to neighbouring countries but try to interfere in the home affairs of other states in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Together with the USA and the South African racists Peking is involved in a plot against Angola. It gives assistance to the Somali invaders in the Horn of Africa and is making friends with the Chilean junta in South

America. China has openly assumed the role of an imperialist stooge in the struggle against the national-liberation movements in the world. This has become particularly evident in recent years in China's attitude towards the events in Western Asia. Up to the very last minute Peking demonstrated its sympathy to the deposed Shah of Iran and became a bitter enemy of the Afghan revolution from the very outset. There is only one thing behind all this: China rejects stability both in Asia and in the whole world. It tried to bring pressure to bear on Burma when it volunteered to mediate between Vietnam and the ASEAN countries, it bluntly opposes any initiative towards normalisation of the situation in the region.

CHANGED LANDMARKS

The Chinese leaders have abandoned the principles they once proclaimed, renounced support for the liberation movements and have drastically reduced aid to the developing countries for the sake of normalising their relationships with the leading capitalist powers.

By 1979 only 35 to 40 per cent of the Chinese overall commitments to the Indian Ocean states had been fulfilled.

At the same time in order to capitalise on Western advanced technology Peking has opened its doors wide to imperialist monopolies. The bait proved tempting enough. In their quest for new markets the US, Japanese and West European companies rushed to China, who encouraged their hopes in every way, calculating how this could benefit its hegemonist plans.

Finally the outlines of Peking's actual policy began to show in the caleidoscope of visits, meetings and negotiations. Peking was letting the West play the "Chinese card" in a game that would bring profit to China. It no longer opposes the USA in Asia, it has nothing against the growing number of American war bases in the Indian Ocean or in Africa. China supports the US-Japanese military alliance, which it so violently condemned before.

Let the arms race accelerate in the region, let new military blocs arise and the old ones spring back to life. Peking seems to believe that all this, though tending to upset the status quo in the region, will not affect China's indisputable superiority over all the neighbouring nations. As to friendship with the imperialist states, it gives Peking access to advanced Western arsenals and sets it free to pursue any expansionist policy.

In a way Peking has won a point in that game. The US Department of Trade issued over 500 li-

gements in 1980 for export to China of so-called double-purpose equipment, that is equipment which can be used both for civilian and military purposes.

US Secretary of State Alexander Haig paid China an official visit last June. He offered to sell China a variety of military hardware so as to facilitate modernisation of the Chinese armed forces. In his reply to a question concerning the visit Haig did not deny that his mission implied a certain change in the US attitude towards arms sales to Peking. He said that the USA no longer listed China among its enemies, but rather put it in the friendly, non-ally category. This means that the USA is prepared to consider Chinese arms requests, if need be, on an individual basis. According to the influential Japanese weekly "Dayamondo" a US military delegation made a confidential visit to Peking late in September and handed to the Chinese a concrete plan of deliveries of advanced US weapons and technology that can be used for military purposes.

The meetings of Foreign Minister Huang Hua with President Reagan and Secretary of State A. Haig in Washington late last year facilitated further exchange of views on different issues. Huang Hua declared after the meeting that in view of the grave instability in the world situation it was especially important to approach and build relationships between the USA and China in the proper strategic perspective.

In Peking's militarisation plans great role is reserved for Japan. The major Japanese companies Hitachi and Fujitsu are vigorously competing with American firms for contracts to deliver to China electronic equipment that can be used for military purposes. One of the major objectives of the Chinese leaders is the use of Japan's industrial potential for escalating Chinese militarisation and implementing Peking's expansionist schemes in South and South-East Asia.

WHAT NEXT!

Peking has reversed its policy twice within three decades. At first it claimed to be a member of the socialist community and a close friend of the USSR. Later it tried to take the lead in the so-called "Third world," stressing in every possible way its status as a developing country. Finally it engaged in knocking together a military-industrial bloc to include China, the USA, Japan and other capitalist states. Thus Peking coolly betrayed its allies twice, and every time it aligned itself with the former enemy.

These sharp turns of the helm in internal and

external policies bring innumerable hardships to the people of China. The country is confronted with immense difficulties in industry, agriculture and living standards. A quarter of its industrial enterprises do not pay, agricultural output is lagging behind the growth of the population, mass unemployment persists in the country, living standards are among the lowest in the world, 100 million people suffer from hunger. At the same time a bitter struggle for power is going on among different groups in the top quarters of the state.

Consequently, grasping first at the line of the "four modernisations" in a vain hope to make another "big leap" and become an advanced industrial country by the end of the century, Peking is now toning down its ambitions. The hopes for early modernisation of the national economy through massive imports of foreign up-to-date technology and equipment clearly proved to be self-delusive, for China does not possess enough hard currency. The stake on exports of raw materials has so far produced but a minor effect. According to an agreement signed in 1978 China pledged to increase its oil deliveries to Japan between 1978 and 1982 from 7 to 15 million tons. Yet even in 1981 over 1,200,000 tons was undelivered, while the prospects for 1982 cover no more than a half of the agreed oil deliveries.

The currency shortage leads to freezing of many economic projects. "Tokyo Shimbun" says that out of the 900 major Sino-Japanese projects constituting part of China's next 5-year economic plan 120 have already been cancelled or frozen and 240 are facing the same fate.

Equally abandoned is the slogan to turn China into an advanced industrial state by the end of the century. Newspapers already admit that it would be a great achievement if China managed to come economically abreast of the Western capitalist countries in 50 or 100 years after the end of the 20th century.

China's uneven internal political development renders hardly predictable the consequences of the China's present line towards militarisation. Indeed, no sooner do you think you have an idea where China is heading, said India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, than Peking makes a turn in the opposite direction. Those who are ready to supply China lavishly with modern arms also realise the possible consequences. The West fears that a stronger China can eventually turn its expansionist ambitions towards its zones of influence, that Peking's hegemonism can collide with the imperialist interests of the United States and Japan. Speculations to this effect are being voiced more and more often in the Western press and even creep into official statements. The Japanese news-

paper "Mainichi" stated that the government of Japan generally tends to oppose export to China of American weapons which could present a danger for the Asian countries.

As to the USA, many influential figures in Washington raise their voice against arming China, against Japanese sales to that country of sophisticated computer equipment adaptable for military use.

Despite all this the "Chinese card" continues to be played. Peking coordinates its actions with the West in opposition to peace and disarmament. Its present policy in complicity with the imperialist states is aimed at destabilising and aggravating the international situation. The position of the Soviet Union in respect of China's policy has been clearly stated in the decisions of the 25th and 26th CPSU congresses. It was again explained by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, L. I. Brezhnev in his speech at the celebrations in Tashkent in spring this year: "We remember well the time when the Soviet Union and people's China were united by the ties of friendship and comradely cooperation. We have never considered the state of hostility and alienation between our countries to be a normal phenomenon. We are prepared to discuss, without any preconditions, and agree upon measures, acceptable to both sides, for improving Soviet-Chinese relations on the basis of mutual respect for each other's interests, noninterference in each other's affairs and mutual benefit, and, of course, not to the detriment of third countries."

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

INDIAN OCEAN 'ZONE OF PEACE' COMMENTARY

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 7, Jul 82 pp 47-48

[Article by V. Yefremov: "A Zone of Peace, Not an Arena of Confrontation"]

[Text]

THE NEW peace initiatives advanced by the head of the Soviet state at the 17th Congress of Soviet Trade Unions have generated international repercussions. Specifically, the world public is showing a profound interest in the Soviet proposal to reach agreement with the United States and other countries on a mutual limitation of naval actions in the World Ocean. "We," stated Leonid Brezhnev, "would also be prepared to discuss the question of spreading confidence-building measures to the seas and oceans, especially to areas through which the busiest shipping routes pass."

One such region is doubtlessly the basin of the Indian Ocean, which washes the territories of over 40 states of Asia, Africa and Australia (they account for approximately a third of the world's population). Though different in their socio-economic systems, population size and land mass, all these states have an equally vital interest in the Indian Ocean being a zone of peace, trade and equitable cooperation. Having a stake in this, for that matter, are all states and peoples of the world, since the Indian Ocean basin connects all five continents to a certain degree.

Turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace is a cherished dream of the region's peoples. For more than a decade now they have been working in the United Nations to make it come true. The conference of littoral and other states of this region, which was held in New York at the demand of the 32nd session of the General Assembly, proposed convening an international conference on turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. Having taken cognisance of the work done by the conference, the 34th session of the UN General Assembly resolved that an International Conference on the Indian Ocean be convened. This conference was torpedoed, however, due to the obstructionist actions of the United States, which happens to consider such a conference "premature."

Meanwhile, the United States is energetically turning the Indian Ocean into a kind of "American lake" surrounded on all sides by US military bases. As Defence Secretary Casper Weinberger stated at a House of Representatives committee

hearing, the United States must ensure its presence in that region and have installations there which it could use to make its presence convincing.

The question "How much more convincing can one get?" involuntarily comes to mind. The Paris-based journal "Afrique-Asie" writes that as it is, the American fleet patrolling the Indian Ocean numbers over 40 warships, including aircraft carriers holding over 150 planes. They cruise here constantly, keeping an especially close eye on the Persian Gulf, where the largest American armada since the Second World War is concentrated. The Pentagon has long begun the formation of the Indian Ocean Fleet, on the permanent basis of the 5th US Fleet, for whose creation 14 billion dollars have been allocated.

Raising a hue and cry around the mythical "Soviet threat" to the Persian Gulf, the US ruling elite is drawing its NATO allies into military ventures in the Persian Gulf basin. An energetic response was made to Washington's appeal by London, where plans are being hatched for a return to the British imperial policy of "eastward from the Suez." Specifically, the British government has dispatched to the Indian Ocean a number of its ships situated in the Far East. France has upwards of 10,000 men and 25 ships in the Indian Ocean. Australia is also teaming up with the USA's NATO allies: its government has sent several of its warships to the Indian Ocean. "Afrique-Asie" writes that this entire armada consisting of over 75 warships, of which more than 40 are subordinated directly to the Pentagon, "keeps one eye on Soviet ships and the other on the people's struggle for political and economic liberation taking place in this region."

The base centre of the US fleet in the Indian Ocean is Diego Garcia Island. The complex of naval and air force installations set up here has also become a spring-board for the USA's rapid deployment forces. Moreover, as the Sri Lanka-based newspaper "Forward" wrote, Diego Garcia Island is becoming a new warehouse of American nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean. The "Los Angeles Times" reported, quoting informed Defence Department sources, that the US Administration is planning to deploy on this island B-52 strategic bombers, which are capable of carrying nuclear weapons on board. The Australian government's intention to permit B-52's permanently based on the island of Guam to land at the base in Darwin is also tied in with the plans to use nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean region. Undoubtedly, the Pentagon's intention to get a firm footing on naval and air bases on the Sinai Peninsula, in Somalia, Kenya and in the racist RSA is likewise subordinated to the realisation of these plans. In short, the USA is intent on setting up a network of military bases along the entire perimeter of the Indian Ocean, Diego Garcia being the centre-piece.

A rather definite conclusion can be drawn from the above: Washington is out to turn the Indian Ocean not into a zone of peace, as the peoples of the world are demanding, but into a zone of its military and political domination, into a zone of confrontation. It is intent on concent-

rating there both its rapid deployment forces to bring pressure to bear on the countries of Asia and Africa, and its strategic forces targeted at the USSR from the south.

This, of course, is acceptable neither to the 40-odd states of the Indian Ocean basin nor to the Soviet Union — a country both European and Asian, one which has a vital stake in the safety of navigation in the Indian Ocean, since through it lies the only year-round open sea route connecting the European part of the USSR with the Soviet Far East.

This is why the Soviet Union supported and continues to support all the initiatives of this region's states aimed at demilitarising the Indian Ocean and turning it into a zone of peace. "Of late," said Leonid Brezhnev in the Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th Party Congress in early 1976, "pronouncements have been proliferating in many countries against any of the powers setting up military bases in the region of the Indian Ocean. We are in sympathy with these pronouncements. The Soviet Union has never had, and has no intention now, of building military bases in the Indian Ocean. And we call on the United States to take the same stand." A year later, on a Soviet initiative bilateral talks began with the United States on limiting and then curtailing military activity in the Indian Ocean. However, in 1978 the United States unilaterally broke off the negotiations without stating its reasons for doing so. Nor does it wish to conduct them today, despite the fact that during the top-level Soviet-American meeting in Vienna in 1979 arrangements were made to resume the negotiations.

The Soviet Union, however, has continued a consistent and persistent struggle to turn the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. In the memorandum "For Peace and Disarmament, for Guarantees of International Security" which it presented at the September 1980 session of the General Assembly, the Soviet Union again came out in support of the desire of the Indian Ocean littoral states to turn their region into a zone of peace, where all foreign military bases would be dismantled and no one would threaten the security, independence and sovereignty of the coastal states.

The 'progressive' world public called the proposals advanced by Leonid Brezhnev in Delhi in a speech before Indian parliamentarians on December 10, 1980 a programme of peace and security for the Indian Ocean area. The head of the Soviet state proposed to the United States, other Western powers, China, Japan, and all concerned states to reach agreement on the following mutual commitments: not to establish foreign military bases in the area of the Persian Gulf and adjacent islands; not to deploy nuclear or any other weapons of mass destruction there; not to use and not to threaten to use force against the countries of the area; not to interfere in their internal affairs; to respect the status of non-alignment; not to draw them into military groupings with the participation of nuclear powers; to respect the sovereign right of the states of the region to their natural resources; not to raise any obstacles or

threats to normal trade exchange and the use of sea lanes that link the states of that region with other countries of the world.

The significance of this Soviet peace programme cannot be rated too highly. It is particularly important in that the Soviet proposals have been tabled in the alarming situation which has taken shape in Asia, particularly in South-west Asia and the Middle East. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the Soviet peace initiative met with understanding and support in the world public at large, especially in Asia, as well as among state officials in Asian countries.

A milestone on the road of demilitarising the Indian Ocean was the international conference "The Indian Ocean — a Zone of Peace" which was held late this past March in the Indian capital of Delhi. It took place at a time when the aggressive forces of imperialism, banking on halting the movement of the people's toward national and social liberation, are escalating the arms race, proclaiming the "acceptability" of nuclear war, and crudely interfering in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Imperialist circles are implementing their dangerous course in the Indian Ocean region as well. In his greeting to the participants of the international conference Leonid Brezhnev reiterated that the Soviet Union supports the proposals of the Indian Ocean countries on turning this region into a zone of peace. Leonid Brezhnev said that the Soviet Union proceeds from the assumption that their realisation could substantially improve the situation in the Indian Ocean. This precisely is the thrust of our proposals on a mutual limitation of naval actions and the application of confidence-building measures to seas and oceans, especially to regions where the busiest navigation lanes lie.

The struggle to turn the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace is mounting. The 36th session of the UN General Assembly affirmed anew the necessity to convene an international conference on this issue, and set a new deadline — the first half of 1983. This conference is, at long last, expected to take place. The littoral states of the Indian Ocean, as well as other concerned countries will undoubtedly make their weighty contribution to a positive settlement of this nagging issue.

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